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Introduction
Over a number of years, Mark Richard has developed an influential account of propositional attitude ascription. The account is motivated primarily by the apparent contextual shiftiness of attitude ascriptions. An attitude ascription is to be deemed true just in case it provides an acceptable translation of an appropriate mental representation -where what counts as an acceptable translation depends on context.
The account itself perhaps receives its most comprehensive treatment in Richard 1990 ; but it is independently developed, defended and discussed in a number of individual articles. Thirteen such articles have now been collected together, along with an introductory essay that details a number of recent developments of Richard's views. 1 Roughly speaking, the essays in the collection form two groups. Seven of the essays chart the development and defence of Richard's account, both before and after Richard 1990 . The remaining six essays tackle more general issues relating to attitude ascriptions -such as propositional quantification, semantic pretence, negative existentials, intensional transitives, tensed beliefs and the role of sense in opaque contexts -, albeit with Richard's account generally playing a prominent role in the discussion. On the whole, the collection provides an excellent example of Richard's rigorous and insightful philosophy. It is recommended for any advanced student or professional working within the philosophies of language or mind.
In what follows, I discuss Richard's account of belief ascription, as developed in four of the collected essays. (The essays in question are : Richard 1989 : Richard , 1993 : Richard , 1995 : Richard , 2006 .) I begin by sketching the account ( §2), before focusing on one particular aspect on which Richard says little: how does context determine which translations are acceptable? I shall develop Richard's suggested answer to this question ( §3), raise two concerns about it ( §4), and close with a speculative alternative ( §5).
Belief ascription
Belief ascriptions, we are told, appear to be contextually shifty. By way of example, consider Kripke's (1979) Richard's terminology (1989: 92-3) . For our purposes, we might roughly say that Pierre's 'French beliefs' (but not his 'English beliefs') include those he would express using 'Londres', and that his 'English beliefs' (but not his 'French beliefs') include those he would express using 'London'.
3 form of natural language sentences. 4 For the sake of a concrete example, let us suppose that Cédric has a belief that is mediated by a relation to a mental representation of the form 'la neige est blanche', which determines (relative to context) the Russellian content:
〈being white, snow〉.
Richard suggests that we take the object of a belief (in a context) to be an interpreted mental representation. He constructs this by pairing each constituent of the mediating mental representation with the content that it determines (in the context). So, in our example, we characterise the object of Cédric's belief thus:
(2) 〈〈'est blanche', being white〉, 〈'la neige', snow〉〉.
Richard calls such entities 'Russellian annotated matrices' (RAMs).
The mental representations in RAMs -e.g., in (2) If (4) is the only restriction in play in c 3 , then, in c 3 : 'snow is white' is an acceptable translation of 'la neige est blanche' since Russellian content is preserved, and since the only restriction in play is that 'snow' translate 'la neige'. So 'Cédric believes that snow is white' is true in c 3 .
However, suppose that, in c 4 , other restrictions are in play, such as both:
Cédric: 'is white' → 'est blanche'.
(Perhaps, for example, we have stipulated that we are playing a game in which 'snow' translates 'l'herbe', but in which 'is white' still translates 'est blanche'.) Is (3) necessary that Cédric has a mental representation 'l'herbe est blanche' that determines the Russellian content 〈being white, snow〉. On the presumption that this is false, it follows that (3) is false in c 4 .
Recall the case of Pierre. Pierre has beliefs that he would express using the sentences 'Londres est jolie' and 'London is not pretty'. Let these sentences stand proxy for the mental representations involved in the beliefs, and let us say that Pierre has a French belief 'Londres est jolie' and an English belief 'London is not pretty'. We suggested earlier that, intuitively, sentence (1) In what follows, I shall assume for the sake of argument that Richard's account, as just sketched, is correct.
Determination of restrictions in context
I said that, in c 1 , it might be plausible to say that the restrictions on translation given in (5) are in play.
Similarly, I said that, in c 2 , it might be plausible to say that the restrictions on translation given in (6) are in play. But how does one come to that conclusion? More generally, how does context determine which restrictions on translation are in play? This is a question on which Richard is a little reticent. He says little more than that '[a set of restrictions on translation] is a contextual parameter determined (in good part) by the intentions and dispositions of speakers ' (2006: 257) . In this section, I shall spell out the view that I think Richard has in mind, before raising two concerns ( §4) and offering a speculative alternative ( §5).
First, note that it is highly plausible that ordinary speakers are sometimes aware that beliefs involve mental representations. This is evidenced by the ordinary speaker's implicit sensitivity to variation in these representations, which is displayed in belief ascription. intentions on a given occasion suffice to determine the relevant restrictions on translation, it is plausible that the speaker is typically disposed, upon requests for clarification etc., to indicate which of the believer's mental representations are involved in the ascribed belief. If this is right, then, just as before, it might be appropriate to model the speaker's dispositions as a set of restrictions on translation -and, as before, this set of restrictions would thereby be the set of restrictions in play in the speaker's context. Thus, a speaker's dispositions might be taken to fix the restrictions on translation in play upon utterance of a particular belief ascription.
It is something like this, I think, that Richard has in mind. Let us call it the 'dispositional account of restriction determination'. I shall now raise two concerns.
Two concerns
For independent reasons (concerning the need to avoid contexts in which incompatible restrictions on translation are in play), Richard needs to endorse a broadly Lewisian picture of conversational score.
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The first concern is that this picture is in tension with the dispositional account of restriction determination. For our purposes, we can understand the picture of conversational score as follows. 
That, roughly, is how to combine Lewis's picture of conversational score with the dispositional account of restriction determination.
The tension is this. As the story has been told, the value of s m is shifted to a value that is determined by the intentions and dispositions of the speaker. These intentions and dispositions need not be such that the other conversational participants have epistemic access to them. But, then, it naturally follows that some conversational participants will lack epistemic access to the new value of the parameter. However, this is anathema to the Lewisian account of conversational score. The raison d'être of the account is to capture the dynamics of conversation in terms of the contributions made by 8 participants. The reason is, I think, quite clear: in a well-run conversation, each party knows (perhaps implicitly) the state of the conversation at each point. This is reflected by Lewis's suggestion that '[c] onversational score is, by definition, whatever the mental scoreboards say it is ' (1979: 346) . It is unclear that there is any room, in a well-run conversation, for variation amongst the 'mental scoreboards' of the conversational participants. So, the values of parameters at t had better be fixed by the course of the conversation up until t -and not by the intentions of dispositions of the speaker.
It is not straightforward to avoid the tension. In particular, it would not suffice as a response to simply alter the account of conversational score -perhaps by rejecting Lewis's comment about mental scoreboards, or by similar means. The problem is this. In a well-run conversation, the hearer grasps the truth conditions of the speaker's utterances 7 -and it seems to be incumbent upon an account of conversation to explain this fact. It is not immediately clear, however, how such an explanation is to be given -at least with regard to belief ascriptions -if we endorse the dispositional account of restriction determination.
There are two things to keep in mind. First, hearers may often have, in a given situation, a reasonable idea of the speaker's relevant intentions and dispositions; in the above example, Mike is likely to have at least some fix on (say) Sara's intention to pick out a belief that Lois would express using 'Superman'. Second, given the dispositional account of restriction determination, a well-run conversation would require that to be so; for Mike to understand Sara, he needs to have such a fix on Sara's intentions. So, if Richard is to use the dispositional account of restriction determination as part of an explanation of how a well-run conversation proceeds, then he should provide an account of the mechanism by which hearers can ascertain the relevant intentions and dispositions of the speaker.
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Such an account should be given, I think, if the dispositional account of restriction determination is to be endorsed.
The second concern is that there are putative counterexamples: there are cases in which restrictions on translation are brought into play, even though the speaker plausibly lacks corresponding intentions and dispositions. Let me give two examples.
Here is the first. Suppose that Mike is confused. He believes that 'Clark Kent' is the name of the superhero, and that the counter ego is (somewhat ironically) named 'Superman'. Moreover, suppose 7 One might contest: perhaps a well-run conversation does not require the hearer to grasp the relevant truth conditions, but something weaker (such as Richard's pictures -see his 1983: 45f). Nonetheless, I suspect that the hearer shall at least require some epistemic access to the speaker's intentions and dispositions. (Consider an utterance of "this is red, and this is an apple". Plausibly, if uttered in a well-run conversation, the hearer should at least grasp whether the two instances of "this"
are co-referential. If the referents of demonstratives are fixed by speaker's intentions, then a well-run conversation may thus require the hearer to have some access to those intentions -i.e. enough access to grasp whether the two instances of "this" are co-referential.) 9 that Mike (mistakenly) thinks that Lois Lane believes that the superhero in question cannot fly.
Finally, suppose that, during a conversation about Superman, Mike utters given which, according to the dispositional account of restriction determination, Mike's assertion is false. To capture our intuitions, it is more natural to say that the following restriction is in play:
This contradicts the prediction given by the dispositional account of restriction determination.
Here is the second example. I do not claim that the concerns raised here are fatal to the dispositional account of restriction determination. But, if Richard intends to endorse it, more needs to be said.
A speculative suggestion
Let me close with a speculative alternative to the dispositional account. Suppose that we endorse the Lewisian picture of conversational score, i.e. we think that well-run conversations have shared scoreboards. Suppose also that there is a contextual parameter for restrictions on translation. Our question is: what determines the value of this parameter?
I am disinclined to think that we can cite a single factor in answer to this question. Instead, there may be a number of factors. Here is a non-exhaustive list of three potential factors. Again, it seems that the restriction is required in order to make the assertion relevant: Pierre's English beliefs just are not relevant to the case in hand.
Overall, Richard has provided us with a highly plausible and detailed account of belief ascription that is available to the fan of Russellian content. The collection offers both accessible entry points to his account, as well as more technical and detailed developments thereof. It comes highly recommended. I hope that, in this short piece, I have provided a few thoughts about how future discussion of Richard's insightful account might be directed.
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